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1 Introduction
Competitiveness is one of the most important concerns that is used by policy makers
to justify policy reforms aimed at improving/restoring the ability of domestic firms to
exhibit high performance on international markets. While the objective is usually macro-
economic in nature, with a goal to ensure a sustainable path of trade balance, the policies
involved are often micro-economic. This is especially true in currency unions such as the
eurozone, where changes in the nominal exchange rate intended to reduce the consumer-
relevant price abroad are not an option. Some of the remaining policy tools available
are directed at non-price competitiveness (R&D tax breaks being one example, see e.g.
Hombert and Matray, 2015). It is however likely that the impact of this type of measures
only manifests itself in the long-run. Shorter-run policies are aimed at reducing the
costs of domestic firms with respect to foreign competitors so as to strengthen price
competitiveness. Numerous channels of action are possible. The basic idea is that export
performance of firms is driven by the export price set by the firm, and that the pass-
through of the cut in unit costs to lower export price is high enough to ensure that
the market share captured by domestic firms on international markets increases. Any
policy reducing the explicit or implicit cost of exports will work under those assumptions.
Reducing the price of energy (or the regulations related to how clean the production
process is) is an option that has been invoked by the recently elected US administration.1
Cutting the costs of using domestic labor is another obvious candidate that can take
di↵erent forms: wage moderation, flexibility in labor market regulations, or transferring
the tax burden of social contributions (payroll tax) to other tax sources for instance.
Our paper focuses on the last of those policies. Since 2013, the French government
implemented a tax credit aimed at boosting competitiveness and employment, named the
CICE in French (standing for Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit or Cre´dit
d’impoˆt pour la compe´titivite´ et l’emploi in French). The policy is intended to act as
a cut in unit labor costs (see section 3 for all details on the policy change). The tax
credit is set proportional to the share of the wagebill paid to workers under a certain
threshold (2.5 times the national minimum wage). Each firm receives a transfer of 4%
(raised to 6% since 2014) of the total wagebill that is under the threshold. This policy
design gives us a natural experiment where we can match for each firm the intensity of
labor cost reduction (that varies according to its original labor force composition), and
1The current US administration has mostly motivated its repeal of pre-existing environmental regula-
tions on the ground of their supposed direct negative employment impact on the energy sector (Volcovici
and Mason, 2017). There is a substantial evidence suggesting that environmental regulations, while pos-
sibly socially desirable, can reduce manufacturing industry’s competitiveness (see e.g. Greenstone et al.,
2012) and trigger substantial displacement and reallocation of jobs across sectors (Walker, 2013).
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its export performances (intensive and extensive margins) before and after treatment.
Our results cast doubts on the e↵ects to be expected from reductions in labor costs
regarding export performance. While the magnitude of our point estimates are consistent
with expectations, i.e. commonly estimated firm-level trade elasticities multiplied by
reasonable values of the share of labor in total costs, coe cients are found to be very
noisy, suggesting lack of robust evidence of a causal e↵ect of the policy.
A recent paper with similar motivation to ours is Decramer et al. (2016), which looks
at how unit labor costs a↵ect export performance using Belgian firm-level data. This
paper finds quite large and significant elasticities, when regressing the change in (log of)
exports on the change in (log of) unit labor costs. When adopting the same specification,
we also find that a 10% increase in unit labor costs is associated with around 2% lower
exports. Another related paper is Gan et al. (2016), who evaluate how regionally-driven
changes in the minimum wage faced by Chinese exporters a↵ect their competitiveness.
In contrast to Decramer et al. (2016), we evaluate a policy that specifically reduced labor
costs in a heterogeneous manner depending on the initial wage structure of the firm.
This o↵ers a natural instrumentation strategy based on the administrative threshold that
determines which employees are eligible to the policy. Compared to Gan et al. (2016),
our work does not rely on the exogeneity of changes in the minimum wage decided by
local authorities. The policy change is national, and heterogeneity in the treatment only
comes through pre-treatment composition of the labor force across firms. The French
government had an aim to bolster national competitiveness, not export performance of
the subset of firms that had a specially high share of workers below a certain threshold.
The choice of the precise threshold was itself not anticipated, and driven by a mix of
considerations related to the impact on unemployment and to budgetary constraints
rather than pre-trends of di↵erent groups of firms.2
In addition to evaluating the impact of a change in labor costs on the competitiveness
of firms on export markets, our paper contributes to the literature on price elasticities in
trade. The largest set of papers in this vein uses variation in tari↵s and / or exchange rates
as price shifters. Berman et al. (2012), Fitzgerald and Haller (2017), Bas et al. (2017),
Berthou and Fontagne´ (2016) are recent contributions that all use firm-level response to
ad valorem tari↵s and exchange rate variation in export markets. Amiti et al. (2014)
and Piveteau and Smagghue (2015) use a related approach, where they calculate the
change in marginal cost implied by the initial composition or inputs imported by each
firm, interacted with exchange rate changes in its sourcing country, which they use to
2It is telling that the initial recommendations of the report inspiring the policy were quite di↵erent,
and in particular wanted to set a much higher wage threshold and target manufacturing, so as to
maximize the benefits expected by the already large exporters (see Fabre, 2012, as well section 3.1 for
an overview of the state of the debate as the legislative process was ongoing).
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predict changes in export prices and therefore export values. One of the most important
finding of that literature is the so-called international elasticity puzzle: the response of
demand to changes in tari↵s is much larger than the impact of changes in exchange
rates, with elasticities typically being estimated (in absolute value) between 3 and 5 for
tari↵s, and often lower than 1 for exchange rates. This is a puzzle since most of our
theoretical framework would predict those two (delivered) price shifters to have the same
e↵ect on trade flows. Fontagne´ et al. (2017) also use the reaction of firm-level exports to
tari↵s and exchange rates, but add the impact of changes in f.o.b prices at the firm level
instrumented by a cost shifter based on how firms di↵er in their electricity bill. The idea
is that changes in electricity prices are mostly driven by regulatory changes interacted
with di↵erences in contract dates and length, that are exogenous to the firm, and do not
a↵ect exports directly. This is one of the most proximate investigation to ours since the
dimension of the estimating variable is firm-level, with a credible claim for exogeneity
and therefore causality in the estimation of the price elasticity. Their results start by
reproducing the international elasticity puzzle: the response of exports to changes in
tari↵s is much larger than the response to changes in exchange rates. They also show
that the changes in f.o.b prices by the exporter have a large impact on demand, with
an elasticity estimated around -5. Compared to this literature, we base our estimates
of the trade elasticity on a policy change, that a↵ected unit costs of di↵erent firms in a
heterogeneous manner.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 structures our analysis in terms
of the underlying theoretical motivation. Section 3 describes the data used, in particular
how we merge the di↵erent elements of firm-level data sources to calculate the intensity
of treatment of di↵erent firms in terms of their labor costs. Section 4 proceeds with
results for di↵erent margins of adjustment to changes in labor costs, before concluding
with section 5.
2 Theoretical motivation
Our theoretical motivation is based on Crozet et al. (2012), who develop the firm-level
export predictions of the Melitz (2003) model and in particular its implications in terms
of empirical implementation. Firms, indexed i and characterized by their unitary cost
↵i (the inverse of their TFP), operate under monopolistic competition to serve CES
consumers in di↵erent markets n with their unique variety. Note that we work with
exporters from a single origin country, France, and therefore have no origin country
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subscript. The representative consumer in n has utility
Un =
✓Z
⌦n
(qn(↵i)/bn(↵i))
  1
  d↵i
◆  
  1
,
where qn(↵i) is the quantity consumed of variety i. The bn(↵i) term is an idiosyncratic
demand shock which lowers utility of individuals in n when consuming this precise variety.
The pricing part is the usual constant markup over marginal cost (Ci): p(↵i) =    1Ci.
The delivered price incorporates an iceberg trade costs (⌧n), such that pn(↵i) = p(↵i)⌧n.
With all those elements at hand, the equilibrium sales of firm i in n write:
xn(↵i) =
✓
 
    1
◆1  
[Ci⌧nbn(↵i)]1   Xn
P 1  n
, (1)
where Xn and Pn respectively represent total expenditure and the ideal CES price index
in n. Taking logs, we have an estimable equation where the log exports should react to
any change in marginal costs with an elasticity reflecting the price elasticity of consumers
(1   ):
ln xn(↵i) = (1  ) ln
✓
 
    1
◆
+(1  ) ln Ci+(1  ) ln ⌧n+ln
✓
Xn
P 1  n
◆
+(1  ) ln bn(↵i).
(2)
Let us now enter into the details of this cost function. We assume functional form to be
a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of several factors, one of which is labor. Among workers, we
distinguish between low/medium skill workers who are eligible to CICE and high-skill
workers who are not:
xi = l
µi
i
 
JY
k=1
v ikik
!1 µi
1
↵i
where li represents labor employed, itself a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of eligible (le) and
non-eligible (ln) parts such that li = (lei )
⌘i(lni )
1 ⌘i . Other factors k are used in quantities
vik by firm i and we assume constant returns such that: µi + (1   µi)
P
k  ik = 1 ,P
k  ik = 1. A set of additional assumptions will greatly ease interpretation of results.
Inside a sector s, we assume that (i) unit input requirements  ik and factor prices rik
faced by firms are the same, (iii) the share of labor µs is constant inside an industry.
Unit costs then take the following form:
Ci = ↵iwµsi
 Y
k
r ksk
!1 µs
Bs| {z }
=ci
= ↵ici (3)
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where Bs = µ µss
 Q
k  
  sk
sk
  (1 µs) and wi = (wei )⌘i(wni )1 ⌘i ⇥ (⌘i) ⌘i(1   ⌘i) (1 ⌘i). It
is critical here that (even though we do not model explicitly labor markets for di↵erent
skills) we let firms have di↵erent labor costs. Particularly important will be the fact that
di↵erent firms have di↵erent shares of their labor force eligible to the policy change (⌘i),
which we consider to be a constant technological parameter.
Substituting (3) in (2), and introducing a time dimension t, the export equation
becomes:
ln xint(↵it) = cst. + (1   )µs lnwit + (1   )
"
lnBs + (1  µs)
X
k
 ks ln rkst
#
| {z }
=FEst
+ (1   ) ln(⌧nt) + lnXnt   (1   ) lnPnt| {z }
=FEnt
+(1   ) ln↵it + (1   ) ln bint| {z }
="int
= (1   )µs lnwit + FEnt + FEst + "int (4)
Firm-level exports are therefore explained by a set of destination-time and sector-time
fixed e↵ects, and our variable of interest, i.e. the relevant wage at the firm-level, wit.
Setting aside for a moment measurement issues on wit, the presence of ↵it in the error
term raises an obvious concern in the estimation of equation (4). It is quite likely that
there exists a cross-sectional correlation between the TFP of firm i and the wages which it
faces (for instance because of the average wage level in the area in which it is located). We
solve this correlation by separating ↵it between a time-invariant unobserved component
and measured covariates that are allowed to vary over time: ln↵it = ln↵i +W0↵it  + uit
where W↵it is a set of exogenous time-variant TFP determinants, and   is a vector of
associated parameters. First-di↵erencing equation (4), we obtain:
  ln xint(↵it) = (1   )µs  lnwit + (1   ) W0↵it  + FEnt + FEst + (1   )( uint + bint)
(5)
We model the CICE as a policy providing a subsidy on the eligible part of the labor force
at a rate ⌫. The e↵ective labor cost in logs writes:
lnwit[⌫] = ⌘i ln(w
e
it[⌫](1  ⌫)) + (1  ⌘i) lnwnit[⌫] (6)
Notation weit[⌫], and w
n
it[⌫]) makes it explicit that the pre-subsidy wages can be a↵ected
by the policy. Equation (6) makes it clear that the direct negative e↵ect of a rise in rate
⌫ on the e↵ective labor cost can be partly attenuated by a rise in equilibrium pre-subsidy
wage. An advantage of our ex-post approach is to capture both direct and indirect e↵ects
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through which the CICE policy is likely to impact e↵ective labor costs.3
One can decompose the change in e↵ective labor costs between the part linked to the
CICE policy, and the part that would have happened without the policy:
  lnwit+1 = lnwit+1[⌫t+1]  lnwit[⌫t]
= lnwit+1[⌫t+1]  lnwit+1[⌫t] + lnwit+1[⌫t]  lnwit[⌫t]
= ⌘i ln
✓
1  ⌫t+1
1  ⌫t
◆
+ ⌘i ln
✓
weit[⌫t+1]
weit[⌫t]
◆
+ (1  ⌘i) ln
✓
wnit[⌫t+1]
wnit[⌫t]
◆
+ lnwit+1[⌫t]  lnwit[⌫t]| {z }
Change in labor costs that would have occurred without the policy
(7)
We assume that the change in labor costs that would have taken place without CICE
can be captured by a combination of sector-time fixed e↵ects and a set of observables.
Formally, we model lnwit+1[⌫t]  lnwit[⌫t] such that :
lnwit+1[⌫t]  lnwit[⌫t] =  W0↵it + FEst + vit, (8)
where we assume that the sets of observables that drive the firm-level TFP and wages over
time are the same. The direct e↵ect of the CICE policy on labor costs is  [⌘i ln(1 ⌫t)] =
⌘i ln
⇣
1 ⌫t+1
1 ⌫t
⌘
, which will be our variable of interest in the regression analysis. Let us
denote ew
e
1 ⌫ and e
wn
1 ⌫ the elasticities of eligible and non-eligible wages with respect to
1  ⌫. Inserting equation (7) and (8) in equation (5) yields, after a few manipulations,4
3The indirect e↵ects are potentially important. The total elasticity of e↵ective labor costs with
respect to the subsidy rate ⌫ writes:
d lnwit
d ln ⌫
=  ⌘i ⌫
1  ⌫ + ⌘i
@ lnweit
@ ln ⌫
+ (1  ⌘i)@ lnw
n
it
@ ln ⌫
Without the indirect e↵ect, a 50 % increase in ⌫ (which happened between 2013 and 2014, when the rate
went from 4 to 6%) has a direct e↵ect of -1.46% on labor costs if 70 % of the firm’s wagebill is eligible
(⌘ = 0, 7). However, this fall will be largely dampened even for very low values of wage elasticities with
respect to ⌫. For instance, for a 1% elasticity of eligible wages, the overall fall in labor costs is reduced
to -1.1% (-0.96% if non-eligible wages also react with a 1% elasticity).
4Substituting (7) and (8) in (5), we obtain
  lnxint(↵it) =(1   )µs [⌘i ln(1  ⌫t)]
+ (1   )µs⌘i ln
✓
weit+1[⌫t+1]
weit+1[⌫t]
◆
+ (1   )µs(1  ⌘i) ln
✓
wnit+1[⌫t+1]
wnit+1[⌫t]
◆
+ (1   ) W0↵it⇢+ FEnt + FEst + (1   )( uint + bint + vit),
where ⇢ ⌘   +   combines the e↵ects of the set of observables W on unit input coe cients and wages.
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the final equation:
  ln xint(↵it) =(1   )µs(1 + ewe1 ⌫   ewn1 ⌫) [⌘i ln(1  ⌫t)]
+ (1   ) W0↵it⇢+ FEst + FEnt + (1   )( uint + bint + vit). (9)
If the policy has no impact on wages (ew
e
1 ⌫ = 0 and e
wn
1 ⌫ = 0), the coe cient estimated on
our treatment variable identifies the product of two structural parameters: labor intensity
in sector s multiplied by the price elasticity of demand: (1    )µs. Considering a labor
intensity such that µs is in a 20 to 25% range, and a value for   around 5 or 6,5 we
expect a coe cient around -1 of the CICE policy on exported values in the absence of
wage response.
Potential e↵ects on wages complexify the interpretation of the coe cient on the treat-
ment variable since it is then (1   )µs(1 + ewe1 ⌫   ewn1 ⌫). The heterogeneity in the e↵ect
then comes not only from the factor intensity of this sector, but also from the reaction
of eligible vs non-eligible labor. The structural interpretation of coe cients is more dif-
ficult, although it does not a↵ect the validity of the reduced form identification of the
treatment e↵ect.
A final issue in estimation of the CICE policy on exports is a selection bias. The flow,
ln xint(↵i), is only observed for the combinations of firm-destinations that are profitable,
i.e. when the following condition is met:
⇡int(↵it) = xint(↵it)/    fn > 0 (10)
This introduces a selection in the sample likely to create a correlation between the error
term and RHS variables. For instance, among the firms with high labor costs, only the
ones having had a particularly strong draw on the idiosyncratic demand shock 1/bn will
be exporting to n. This will create an attenuation bias in estimated coe cients. A
way to minimize the issue is to proceed to robustness checks using a subsample of firms
large and productive enough to be considered su ciently distant from the cost cuto↵
Noting that ln
⇣
weit+1[⌫t+1]
weit+1[⌫t]
⌘
= ew
e
1 ⌫ ln
1 ⌫t+1
1 ⌫t = e
we
1 ⌫  ln(1  ⌫t), we can regroup terms such that:
  lnxint(↵it) =(1   )µs(1 + ewe1 ⌫   ew
n
1 ⌫) [⌘i ln(1  ⌫t)]
+ (1   )µsewn1 ⌫  ln(1  ⌫t) + FEst| {z }
=FEst
+ (1   ) W0↵it⇢+ FEnt + (1   )( uint + bint + vit).
5This corresponds to a central value in Bas et al. (2017) estimates on French exporters. Head and
Mayer (2014) report 5.03 as a median value of such elasticities in the gravity literature.
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for profitable exports so that the error term is unlikely to matter much for their entry
decision. We follow this approach by focusing some of our analysis on a subsample of
firms that serve continuously their markets (destination) during the entire sample period
(2010-2015) and that belong to the top quartile in terms of number of markets served.6
3 Data
3.1 The genesis of the CICE reform
In this section, we describe the policy we are using in order to gauge to what extent labor
costs matter for exporting firms. This policy, labeled CICE by the French authorities,
was decided in 2012, in a period of challenging economic situation for the newly elected
government. Corporate profits were considered to be at a historically low level7 and
French firms had been rapidly losing market share in foreign markets for several years
(Bas et al., 2015). In that context, the government ordered a report on the state of
the manufacturing sector in France (Gallois, 2012). The report, often referred to as
Rapport Gallois, named after its main author, advocated in favor of large cuts in payroll
taxes for employees earning up to 3.5 times the amount of the current minimum wage.
While there had been large cuts in payroll taxes since the early nineties, those were
concentrated on low wages. At the time of CICE implementation, those pre-existing tax
cuts were indeed concentrated on the bottom of the wage distribution (up to 1.6 times
the minimum wage, see Figure 1). Extending the payroll tax cuts to workers higher up
in the wage distribution was presented as a way to target manufacturing and exporting
firms who tend to pay higher wages and therefore did not benefit from the pre-existing
tax cut programs.
A debate engaged after the initial proposal of the Rapport Gallois, which was consid-
ered by many to be too costly and was criticized by labor economists who contended that
the employment e↵ects of cuts in payroll taxes are stronger when targeted on low wages
where demand is more price elastic and unemployment is high (see Cahuc and Carcillo
(2014) for an example of that view). As a compromise, a threshold of 2.5 times the
minimum wage was chosen and passed into law. Finally, in order to ease the short-term
6This approach was adopted in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) when studying gender bias in the
labor market. Fitzgerald and Haller (2017) and Paravisini et al. (2015) apply this method in the context
of firm-level trade. The generalized Tobit approach proposed by Eaton and Kortum (2001) and applied
by Crozet et al. (2012) to French exporters could be envisioned. However, the current state of this
technique does not easily allow for panel data, which is central in our paper.
7The profit rate (defined as ratio of gross operating surplus to value added) was at 30.25% in 2012, a
figure lower than in previous years (31.7% over the years 2008-2011 and 32.63% for the years 2000-2010.
Source: INSEE, Comptes nationaux).
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fiscal impact in a time of tight budgetary constraints, the government chose to opt for a
tax credit system rather than a (direct) payroll tax cuts. Firms could claim a corporate
tax credit at a rate proportional to the wagebill accrued to workers earning less than 2.5
minimum wages. The rationale for this choice was to change firms’ incentives immedi-
ately while delaying the budgetary burden of the policy by a year. The policy was put in
place in January 2013, with a tax credit rate of 4% (of the wagebill of all workers under
2.5 minimum wages). In January 2014, the rate was raised to 6%. Concretely, in the case
of a financial year ending 31 December 2014, the CICE relating to remuneration paid
in 2014 is deducted from the tax due for the financial year ending 31 December 2014.
In case the CICE amount exceeds the tax that is owed by the firm, the tax credit can
be used against taxes due for the next three financial years (e.g. 2015, 2016 and 2017).
After three years, the tax credit is refunded to the firm. Interestingly for our purpose,
we note that no other regulatory thresholds existed at 2.5 times the minimum wage prior
to this reform.
Moreover the reform is unlikely to have been anticipated by firms. Indeed, as men-
tioned above, the government’s decision to implement the CICE was taken in reaction
to the Gallois report about the state of manufacturing in France which was released on
November 5, 2012. The original proposal contained in the report was deemed excessively
costly and the actual CICE ended up di↵ering substantially from the proposal: it was
implemented as a corporate income tax credit instead of a direct cut in social contri-
bution and, most importantly, its threshold was set up to 2.5 instead of 3.5 times the
minimum wage. Little time elapsed between the release of the report – November 5th
2012 – and the implementation of the modified version of the CICE beginning January
1st 2013 (from Finance Act of December 29th 2012). This reduces the chances that firms
could anticipate and adapt their wage policy in 2012 to maximize the amount of the tax
credit to be received based on the 2013 wage structure.
3.2 The parameters of the policy
The schedule for the CICE in 2014 is presented in Figure 1. The x-axis features the ratio
of the worker’s wage over minimum wage, while the y-axis represents the reduction in
labor cost due to the policy change. Panel (a) shows the reduction in terms of percentage
of the total wage paid, while panel (b) expresses it in annual euros saved on each worker.
There are two curves on each panel. The first one shows the schedule of payroll tax cut
that existed before 2014, and which was maintained as is. The second one shows the tax
cut schedule of the CICE: flat at 6% before the 2.5 threshold, 0 afterwards. Marginally,
the firm receives a tax credit that is equal in 2014 to 6% (4% in 2013) of the total labor
10
Figure 1: The schedule of the 2014 CICE and of pre-existing payroll tax cuts
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a: Labor cost reduction as share of gross wage b: Labor cost reduction in euros per year
Note: Prexisting payroll tax cuts refer to the general payroll tax cuts applicable prior to the CICE – so-called
“exone´rations ge´ne´rales de cotisations sociales” (see Bunel and L’Horty, 2012; Cahuc and Carcillo, 2014).
cost on each worker that is paid less than 2.5 times the minimum wage. At the threshold
of 2.5 times the minimum wage, the firm gets a tax credit that amounts to about 2,500
euros per worker-year.
It is important to note that the discontinuity occurs at the worker level, while our
variables of interest (export performance, labor cost) are intrinsically defined at the firm-
level. We could exploit a discontinuity at the firm-level if we focused on those firms whose
entire workforce is located slightly below the 2.5 minimum wage threshold (fully treated)
versus firms paying all of its employees just above the threshold (untreated). However, all
firms in our sample exhibit su cient wage variation to make it impossible to implement
a firm-level regression discontinuity design. Against this di culty, we choose to rely on
continuous variation in treatment – which is the sum of worker-level binary eligibility
variables – within a di↵erence-in-di↵erence setting.
How much does each firm receive in terms of tax cuts therefore depends on the com-
position of its labor force. A firm that has all of its employees paid at the minimum
wage sees its labor costs reduced by 4% between 2012 and 2013. At the other extreme,
a firm where every employee earns more than the 2.5 threshold is not treated and has
unchanged labor costs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the treatment intensity in our
sample of continuing exporters between 2010 and 2015. Panel (a) spans over firms, and
shows a histogram of the CICE-implied labor cost reduction in the first two years of
treatment, based on the amount truly received. While a substantial share of exporters
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have all of their employees under the threshold,8 and therefore have an overall treatment
of 4% in 2013 and 6% in 2014, there is substantial variation of the intensity of treatment
in the population of French exporters. Panel (b) shows the most a↵ected industries in our
sample, calculating the average intensity of treatment across the 2-digit manufacturing
industries to which our exporters belong. Wood, Furniture, Food and Textile are among
the industries where continuing exporters are the most heavily treated. Chemicals, Phar-
maceuticals, Beverages, are representative examples of the other side of the spectrum,
where wages are high enough for a large portion of the employees to be untreated.
Figure 2: The distribution of CICE-implied variation in labor cost
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Note: The sample includes firms that export continuously from 2010 to 2014. Digits in the right panel refers to 2-digit NACE sectors
whose labels are the following: 16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of
straw and plaiting materials ; 31 Manufacture of furniture ; 18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media ; 10 Manufacture of food
products ; 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment ; 13 Manufacture of textiles ; 23 Manufacture
of other non-metallic mineral products ; 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers ; 15 Manufacture of leather and
related products ; 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products ; 24 Manufacture of basic metals ; 30 Manufacture of other transport
equipment ; 14 Manufacture of wearing apparel ; 17 Manufacture of paper and paper products ; 32 Other manufacturing ; 28 Manufacture
of machinery and equipment n.e.c. ; 11 Manufacture of beverages ; 27 Manufacture of electrical equipment ; 20 Manufacture of chemicals
and chemical products ; 26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products ; 21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
and pharmaceutical preparations ; 12 Manufacture of tobacco products ; 19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products. Source:
NACE Rev. 2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community.
3.3 Firm-level trade and workers
Firm-level data come from a combination of four sources. The first one is produced
by the customs o ce, and compiles the exported values and quantities for each firm-
destination-product combination. The second one, produced by the French statistical
institute (INSEE), contains balance-sheet data for firms. It uses the same identifier for
8A small share of firms seem to have received more tax credit than the maximum possible, which
reflects some noise in the reporting of either the gross wagebill or of the amount of CICE received.
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the firm, and is mostly used in our sample to obtain control variables, such as value-
added or the capital stock. The third source is the employer-employee data also created
by INSEE, and named DADS. All workers of a given firm (identified with same number as
the two other sources) are recorded in DADS, which we use to obtain hourly wages. This
very rich source is critical for calculating the predicted intensity of treatment at the firm
level. The fourth source is an administrative file, named MVC, that contains the actual
amount of tax credit claimed by each firm. We use it to compute the treatment intensity
which we will then instrument with the predicted treatment intensity as computed using
the DADS dataset.
We keep firms that are present in all four datasets and for which the main activity
reported belongs to manufacturing. Furthermore, we exclude firms that are in the top
percentile in terms of CICE intensity (those do report considerably more than that the
maximum rate that should be possible to claim) in any given year. We finally focus on
a balanced sample of firms present in the dataset over the 2010-2015 period.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Intensive margin sample
mean sd p50 p5 p95
CICE over wagebill = CitWit 0.036 0.017 0.037 0.000 0.060
Export over sales 0.250 3.102 0.124 0.003 0.788
ln(Exports per worker) 2.242 1.954 2.480 -1.293 4.915
lnVA per worker 11.028 0.526 11.000 10.322 11.859
lnAssets 14.588 1.970 14.431 11.610 18.105
lnAv. wage 10.481 0.285 10.447 10.118 10.944
lnHours 10.873 1.447 10.812 8.629 13.389
# markets served (per year) 13.578 16.604 7.000 1.000 48.000
Observations 82998
Notes: The sample includes all firms eligible for the CICE program which are reporting positive exports every year be-
tween 2010 and 2015. All monetary variables (value of exports, value-added, wages) are expressed in current euros.
The sample we use for the extensive margin analysis is the set of firms that are
continuously present in the balance-sheet and employer-employee datasets over the 2010-
2015 period. The one we use for the intensive margin analysis is the set of continuous
exporters over the same period. We refer to the first and second samples with ME and
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MI respectively. The MI sample (described in Table 1) exhibits a ratio of tax credit
over wagebill that is smaller than the ME one (described in Table 2). This reflects
the usually found overall exporter premium on variables such as value-added, size and
wages also found here. Even though the MI firms constitute a sample of manufacturing
firms that are productive enough to remain exporters over the whole sample, the ratio of
exported value over total sales is still at a low 12.4% for the median firm, which typically
serves 7 markets. The average ratio of exports to total sales is at 25%. Table 2) also
shows that the proportion of exporters is 37%. Both numbers are higher than the usual
figures for the US (18% for average exporter shares, 14% for ratio of export value over
total sales) reported in Bernard et al. (2007). Note however that the sample here is
manufacturing only, and constrained to continued presence in several firm-level datasets
over 5 years, which probably selects larger firms. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) report
export participation rates and share of exports in total sales that are very comparable
to ours for several European countries with samples constrained to have firms above a
certain size.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Extensive margin sample
mean sd p50 p5 p95
CICE/Wage bill 0.041 0.019 0.041 0.000 0.066
I(Xit > 0) 0.372 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
lnVA per worker 10.905 0.521 10.882 10.195 11.728
lnAssets 13.167 1.829 12.924 10.607 16.570
lnAv. wage 10.427 0.348 10.393 9.964 11.016
lnHours 9.698 1.450 9.567 7.549 12.317
Observations 280950
Notes: The sample includes all firms eligible for the CICE program which are observed every year between 2010 and
2015, irrespectively whether they export or not. All monetary variables (value of exports, value-added, wages) are
expressed in current euros.
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4 Results
4.1 Descriptive evidence
One important characteristic of the CICE policy is that it mostly a↵ects firms that were
initially less export-oriented. Firms that do export in positive amounts, and those that
have the highest share of exports in their total sales tend to pay higher wages, and are
therefore the ones where the treatment is less intense. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 show
those two negative relationships: export intensity and export probability both decline
with the lagged amount of subsidy received in 2014.9
The top 5% CICE recipients (as a share of wagebill) in 2013 had an average ratio of
exports over turnover of 17 % in 2012. The same ratio for the bottom 5% of recipients
was 40 %. The extensive margin evidence is more complex, and clearly non-monotonous
in the top part of the treatment intensity.
Figure 3: Initially export-oriented firms were less exposed to the policy - 2014
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Ex
po
rts
/S
ale
s (
at
 t-
1)
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
CICE/Wage bill (at t)
a: Intensive margin: exports / sales
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 e
xp
or
te
rs
 (a
t t
-1
)
.02 .04 .06 .08
CICE/Wage bill (at t)
b: Extensive margin: probability of export
Note: Each dot corresponds to a quantile (20) of the treatment intensity in 2014. The x-axis reports treatment intensity,
while the y-axis plots the average export intensity / share of exporters in the corresponding quantile.
We also present graphical evidence regarding the first-stage of our instrumentation
strategy in Figure 4 among the sample of continuing exporters (left panel) and all firms
(right panel). For both sample, we see a clear positive relationship between the instru-
mental and the endogenous variables that is approximately linear, when aggregating over
20 bins of the instrument.
9A very similar relationship holds for 2013 as is displayed in Figure A1 in the appendix.
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Figure 4: First stage : among continuing exporters and among all firms
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Instrument: Predicted CICE-induced variation in lab. cost
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Note: The x-axis corresponds to 20 quantiles of the predicted treatment intensity. The y-axis reports the average value of
the actual treatment intensity in each quantile.
4.2 The impact of CICE on exports
Empirical approach
We implement the estimation of equation (9) at the destination ⇥ firm-level. We
choose to retain the destination dimension despite the fact that our variable of interest
only varies at the firm-level because destination-specific shocks that are potentially cor-
related with exposure to the labor cost reduction induced by the policy could cause bias
in our estimates. The estimating equation writes as follows:
  ln xint =   Dit + W
0
↵it⇢+ FEnt + FEst + "int (11)
with Dit ⌘ ln
⇣
1  CitWit
⌘
the empirical counterpart of the treatment variable  [⌘it ln(1 
⌫t)]. We denote with Cit the amount of CICE subsidy received and Wit as total (gross)
wagebill.10 W0↵it includes a list of controls likely to drive the evolution of firm-level unit
10We could have built the variable ⌘it ln(1   ⌫t) using solely the DADS matched employer-employee,
computing the wage share of eligible labor (⌘it) and applying the rate of subsidy ln(1 ⌫t). The resulting
variable should be equal to our measure Cit/Wit – where the denominator is computed using the DADS
dataset and the numerator comes from a special administrative files on claimed tax credits. Nevertheless
it is only approximately true due to the fact that minor components of labor earning to which the tax
credit do not apply are included in the DADS measure of wages – e.g. work-related expenses. We
therefore prefer to use the Cit/Wit ratio. The variable ln(1   Cit/Wit) is a very close counterpart
to the variable relevant in the theoretical framework as both variables are equal up to a first-order
approximation. Indeed we can see that ⌘it ln(1   ⌫t) ⇡  ⌘it⌫t where the first order approximation is
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costs, beyond the global evolution of the sector in France captured by FEst – which is a
3-digit sector ⇥ year fixed-e↵ect.
In order to causally assess the impact of the cut in payroll taxes, we use an instru-
mental variable Zit corresponding to lagged predicted amount received ⌘i,t 1 ln(1   ⌫it),
used either directly or as an instrument for Dit, and constructed as
Zit =
eligible wagebilli,t 1
wagebilli,t 1
⇥ ln (1  ⌫t) , (12)
where ⌫t is the rate of payroll tax cut implied by the CICE policy, 4% in 2013, 6% since
2014.
OLS and IV results
Putting aside causality issues as a start, we first present regressions between the
amount of subsidy received and export performance, that should be interpreted as cor-
relations without taking a stance on the direction of causality. Results for several speci-
fications are presented in Table 3.
The first three columns include all firms, while the last three limit attention to the
set of firms considered far enough from the truncation point of profitable exports so
that selection issues should be minimized. Those are the ones that serve continuously
their markets over the entire sample period (2010-2015) and belong to the top quartile
of exporters in terms of number of destination. We experiment with di↵erent sets of
fixed e↵ects and controls over columns. Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) simply have sector-
year e↵ects, while columns (3) and (6) introduce destination-year e↵ects. The treatment
intensity variable has the expected negative sign but is too noisy to be significant in all
columns. The magnitude of the coe cient is also smaller than expected, given reasonable
estimates of consumers’ price elasticity and the share of labor in production costs.
We now turn to instrumented results, meant to provide a better assessment of the
causal e↵ect of the subsidy. An example of endogeneity issue is the tendency of firms
experiencing a boom in their exports to “share the rent” with workers through wage
increases (see e.g. Carluccio et al., 2015). These wage increases directly impact the
CICE treatment variable, which is a↵ected by the share of the wagebill under a certain
threshold. This is only one of the many causes that could induce a correlation between
the unobserved determinants of export performance (the error term of equation 11) and
the subsidy received. Most of the endogeneity concerns suggest an attenuation bias. For
instance, reverse causality could even be at work since a negative draw on export markets’
taken around ⌫t = 0 and that ln(1 Cit/Wit) ⇡  Cit/Wit =  ⌘it⌫t where the first order approximation
is taken around Cit/Wit = 0.
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Table 3: Received CICE and exports (OLS)
All firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint
  ln
 
1  CW
 
it
-0.239 -0.193 -0.198 -0.190 -0.146 -0.144
(0.172) (0.173) (0.172) (0.200) (0.200) (0.199)
  lnVA per workeri,t 1 0.0122 0.0118 0.0239* 0.0239*
(0.00970) (0.00971) (0.0123) (0.0123)
  lnAssetsi,t 1 0.0792*** 0.0796*** 0.0502*** 0.0511***
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0170) (0.0170)
  lnAv. wagei,t 1 0.00868 0.00919 -0.0264 -0.0255
(0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0606) (0.0601)
  lnHoursi,t 1 0.0620*** 0.0613*** 0.0302 0.0294
(0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0290) (0.0287)
Observations 758142 604573 604544 419503 331990 331950
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.010
Year ⇥ Sector FE p p p p p p
Destination ⇥ Year FEs p p
# firms 13829 13788 13788 4807 4795 4795
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level).  xt ⌘ xt+1   xt. * : p<0.10, ** :
p<0.05, *** : p<0.01. Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs
implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The
balanced sample covers the years 2012 to 2014 (two period with first di↵erences).
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performance (losing a large contract for instance) could result in wage cuts, making the
firm more eligible to CICE.
We therefore instrument the intensity of treatment by a variable that is using the
wage structure of the firm before the policy was put in place. This IV is the level of
subsidy that the firm was expected to receive from its historical wage distribution. Table
4 report results of the instrumented version of the regressions.
The coe cients obtained are both larger (in absolute value) and more statistically
significant. The coe cients obtained for large firms (last 3 columns) are close to -1.
Assuming a share of labor in total costs around 20 % implies a price elasticity of demand
around 6, compatible with existing literature estimating this elasticity on firm-level ex-
ports (Fontagne´ et al. (2017) being a recent example, particularly relevant since it es-
timates the trade elasticity using a cost shifter–electricity prices–on French exporters).
Adding controls at the firm level and fixed e↵ects for destinations however reduces the
magnitude and significance of the e↵ect. This points to a lack of robustness in the e↵ect
of this policy on the intensive margin of exports.
Long-di↵erence regressions
We have failed at this point to detect robust e↵ects of the policy on export revenues.
It is possible that the policy took time to be e↵ective if, for instance, firms used the sub-
sidy to invest in quality upgrading or in an improvement of the production process. We
estimate a slightly di↵erent specification from Equation (11) in order to allow for both
time-varying e↵ects and potentially lagged e↵ects of the policy. We keep one observation
per firm and project directly the change in export revenue with respect to 2012 for sev-
eral di↵erent time horizons onto the average policy-induced labor cost variation between
2012 and 2015. As above, the actual policy-induced labor cost variation received is in-
strumented using the treatment as predicted by the 2012 wage structure. This method
has the advantage of allowing for time-varying e↵ects and does not impose dynamic re-
strictions on the estimates (Jorda`, 2005; Zidar, 2017). Results are presented in Table 5.
Results are overall disappointing. In the largest sample, the magnitude of coe cients is
comparable to the ones from Table 4, but estimates are noisy and sensitive to the period
considered when estimating the e↵ect. In the sample focusing on large firms, which is
our preferred one for the selection issues mentioned at the end of the theory section, we
again find volatile e↵ects, with one coe cient even exhibiting a perverse positive sign.
To summarize, the policy under investigation has mostly shown no robust e↵ect of the
intensive margin of exporting patterns. We cannot completely discard the possibility that
this policy aimed at reducing labor costs has a delayed e↵ect being channeled through
long-run investment decisions. However, with the data at hand, which is limited to 3
19
Table 4: Received CICE and exports (IV)
All firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint
  ln
 
1  CW
 
it
-0.968 -0.701 -0.557 -1.397** -0.902 -0.809
(0.680) (0.684) (0.693) (0.698) (0.713) (0.723)
  lnVA per workeri,t 1 0.0124 0.0119 0.0241* 0.0241*
(0.00970) (0.00971) (0.0123) (0.0123)
  lnAssetsi,t 1 0.0787*** 0.0793*** 0.0498*** 0.0507***
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0168) (0.0169)
  lnAv. wagei,t 1 0.00900 0.00941 -0.0259 -0.0250
(0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0609) (0.0603)
  lnHoursi,t 1 0.0621*** 0.0614*** 0.0303 0.0295
(0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0291) (0.0287)
Observations 611449 604573 604544 335603 331990 331950
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.010
Year ⇥ Sector FE p p p p p p
Destination ⇥ Year FEs p p
First Stage Coe↵ 0.571*** 0.578*** 0.570*** 0.614*** 0.622*** 0.616***
(0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0242)
K-P stat 1039 1089 1041 645 667 646
# firms 13827 13788 13788 4807 4795 4795
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level).  xt ⌘ xt+1   xt. * : p<0.10, ** :
p<0.05, *** : p<0.01. Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs
implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The bal-
anced sample covers the years 2012 to 2014 (two period with first di↵erences). K-P Statistic refers to the Kleibergen-Paap
statistic for the first stage.
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Table 5: Long di↵erences: IV estimates
All firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  ln x012,013   ln x012,014   ln x012,015   ln x012,013   ln x012,014   ln x012,015
  ln
 
1  CW
 
12,15
-0.816 -1.138* -0.423 -0.614 -0.708 0.297
(0.504) (0.621) (0.754) (0.520) (0.696) (0.897)
  lnVA per workeri,t 1 -0.00509 0.00250 -0.00688 0.0216 -0.00119 0.00313
(0.0189) (0.0220) (0.0243) (0.0191) (0.0264) (0.0325)
  lnAssetsi,t 1 0.105*** 0.170*** 0.178*** 0.0528* 0.133*** 0.173***
(0.0269) (0.0331) (0.0410) (0.0282) (0.0370) (0.0490)
  lnAv. wagei,t 1 0.0818** 0.114** 0.130** 0.0290 0.0802 0.0448
(0.0392) (0.0451) (0.0529) (0.0433) (0.0507) (0.0624)
  lnHoursi,t 1 0.0772** 0.136*** 0.170*** 0.0449 0.0981** 0.132**
(0.0390) (0.0454) (0.0550) (0.0357) (0.0452) (0.0539)
Observations 150837 134238 129502 83090 83090 83090
R2 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.006 0.009 0.019
Year ⇥ Sector FE p p p p p p
Destination ⇥ Year FEs p p p p p p
K-P stat 5436 5158 5052 2805 2805 2805
# firms 13487 13238 13089 4752 4752 4752
Notes: Each column corresponds to the same specification where only the horizon over which the growth of the dependent variable (average an-
nual export growth) is computed varies (2012-2013 for the column 1 and 3, 2012-2014 for columns 2 and 5, 2012-2015 for columns 3 and 6).
The variable   ln
⇣
1  CW
⌘
12,15
represents the average decline in labor cost implied by the policy based over the years 2012-2015. It is in-
strumented by [⌘2012 12 15ln(1  ⌫)] which represents the average decline in labor cost implied by the policy based on 2012 wage structure
over the years 2012-2015.
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years post treatment, our results do not strongly point in that direction.
4.2.1 Were more profitable firms more reactive to the policy?
As explained in section 3.1, the CICE is a corporate income tax credit aiming at “mim-
icking” the e↵ects of a direct cut in payroll tax. Therefore, firms which do not report
any taxable profits do not face the same incentives as the ones that can deduct from
their corporate taxation the total amount they are entitled to. To enter the details of
the policy: a firm with negative or near zero profits in year t does not benefit from the
tax credit accrued based on its wagebill during year t  1 at year t but will instead need
to wait until t+ 1 in case it generates enough taxable income during that period. Firms
that are not profitable at any point past t will have to wait for three years until the tax
authorities transfer the amount of the tax credit to the firm.
In order to investigate the heterogeneity of e↵ects based on profitability, we introduce
an interaction term between the intensity of treatment and a dummy variable which is
set to one if the firm reported positive corporate income tax every year between 2010
and 2012 (TPi). We expect this interaction term to have a negative sign, since it signals
a larger impact of the policy for the firms that are likely to obtain the tax credit with
the least lag. Results are somehow supportive of the idea that firms are sensitive to the
lag between the payroll tax cut entitlement and its payment: all interaction terms are
negative, although not significantly so. This points to the fact that the precise design of
this type of policy matters: Blurring the connection between the labor cost determinants
of the tax cut and the actual payment of the cut (through a delay in this case) seems to
weaken the e↵ects of the policy.
4.3 Other Outcomes
4.3.1 The impact of the CICE policy on export prices
The overall absence of statistically significant impact of the policy could come from two
main causes. The first is that the fall in labor costs is not (or incompletely) passed by
firms into their export prices. In that case, the price competitiveness of firms benefiting
from the policy would not be a↵ected. The second is that the price elasticity of demand
is too low to enable detection of a statistically significant e↵ect.
Our data enables us to calculate unit values which is the best we can do to measure
(f.o.b) export prices, dividing value exported by quantities (measured in tons in the
customs files). Some (firm ⇥ destination) couples have no quantity available which
explains why there is a slightly lower number of observations compared to regressions
from Table 4. We first investigate the statistical association between export prices and
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Table 6: Received CICE and exports (IV), heterogeneity based on profitability
All firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint   ln xint
TPi ⇥  ln
 
1  CW
 
it
-0.0689 -0.0793 -0.0548 -0.165 -0.242 -0.239
(0.330) (0.331) (0.331) (0.389) (0.389) (0.390)
  ln
 
1  CW
 
it
-1.079 -0.801 -0.669 -1.486** -0.962 -0.865
(0.688) (0.693) (0.701) (0.713) (0.729) (0.739)
TPi 0.0219*** 0.0192*** 0.0203*** 0.0261*** 0.0230*** 0.0233***
(0.00537) (0.00532) (0.00532) (0.00583) (0.00577) (0.00578)
  lnVA per workeri,t 1 0.0133 0.0129 0.0250** 0.0250**
(0.00967) (0.00968) (0.0123) (0.0123)
  lnAssetsi,t 1 0.0772*** 0.0777*** 0.0473*** 0.0482***
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0165) (0.0166)
  lnAv. wagei,t 1 0.00704 0.00735 -0.0284 -0.0275
(0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0608) (0.0603)
  lnHoursi,t 1 0.0603*** 0.0594*** 0.0279 0.0271
(0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0287) (0.0284)
Observations 611449 604573 604544 335603 331990 331950
R2 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.010
Year ⇥ Sector FE p p p p p p
Destination ⇥ Year FEs p p
K-P stat 513 536 513 318 327 318
# firms 13827 13788 13788 4807 4795 4795
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level).  xt ⌘ xt+1 xt. * : p<0.10, ** : p<0.05, ***
: p<0.01. Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE
policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years
2012 to 2014 (two period with first di↵erences). K-P Statistic refers to the Kleibergen-Paap statistic for the first stage. TP is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported positive corporate income tax during every year between 2010 and 2012. It does
not vary over time and is therefore omitted in columns (4) and (6).
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the policy without looking for the direction of causality. Results are reported in Table 7,
with the same set of specifications as in our benchmark on export values. The expected
magnitude of the coe cient is quite intuitive. With constant markups, the pass-through
elasticity of changes in costs should be one. Therefore, the expected impact on unit
values should reflect the share of labor in total marginal costs of the firms.
Table 7: Received CICE and unit values (IV)
All firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  lnUVint   lnUVint   lnUVint   lnUVint   lnUVint   lnUVint
  ln
 
1  CW
 
it
0.123 0.352 0.341 -0.141 0.0741 0.0637
(0.423) (0.421) (0.427) (0.431) (0.439) (0.444)
  lnVA per workerit -0.00820 -0.00813 -0.00354 -0.00374
(0.00631) (0.00632) (0.00678) (0.00679)
  lnAssetsit 0.00222 0.00220 -0.00298 -0.00269
(0.00741) (0.00741) (0.00812) (0.00810)
  lnAv. wageit -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0313 -0.0311
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0202) (0.0205)
  lnHoursit -0.00798 -0.00828 -0.0148 -0.0153
(0.00767) (0.00772) (0.00962) (0.00974)
Observations 535759 529942 529914 344718 341250 341208
R2 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005
Year ⇥ Sector FE p p p p p p
Destination ⇥ Year FEs p p
# firms 11356 11323 11323 5904 5889 5889
K-P stat 858 910 884 705 732 716
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level).  xt ⌘ xt+1   xt. * : p<0.10, ** : p<0.05, *** :
p<0.01. Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE policy.
The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years 2012 to 2014
(two period with first di↵erences).
Results show that the response of prices to the amount of labor cost subsidy received
depends upon the size of firms. In the full sample, the coe cients imply labor costs
shares between 12 and 35% which is reasonable, but none of those e↵ects is significant.
For larger firms, the implied shares are much lower, which is probably intuitive, but again
the e↵ect is not statistically di↵erent from 0. In sum, the pass-through into export prices
is weak at best. One interpretation is that signs and magnitudes of the volume and price
e↵ects are coherent, and reasonably consistent with expectations, despite large amount
of noise (perhaps due to the complex design of the policy). The other interpretation, is
that firms did not consider this policy to be a “true” reduction in labor costs, that could
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translate into lower prices and large export volumes, explaining that we find no robust
e↵ect at the intensive margin.
4.3.2 Impact on the extensive margin
It is possible (although unlikely and not fully consistent with the benchmark model of
heterogeneous firms in trade) that the whole of the e↵ects of the evaluated policy took
place at the extensive margin, i.e. boosting the entry rate of French firms on di↵erent
export markets. In order to allow for a rich structure of fixed e↵ects that is needed in our
context we use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) in order to investigate this extensive
margin of adjustment to labor cost changes in first-di↵erence. Our dependent variable in
the first two columns is identifying entry (1 if the firm did not export in t  1 and does
in t, and 0 if it did not change status and -1 if it ceased to export between t  1 and t).
The last two columns re-estimate the model in levels, where the LHS is the export status
each year. We find again no statistical evidence of a change in export status that could
be attributed to the change in labor costs.
Table 8: Received CICE and export probability (IV)
First Di↵. model Fixed e↵ect model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 I(Xit > 0)  I(Xit > 0) I(Xit > 0) I(Xit > 0)
ln
 
1  CW
 
it
0.133 0.0496 0.247 0.195
(0.285) (0.282) (0.153) (0.152)
Observations 187300 183314 234125 230477
R2 0.002 0.002 0.876 0.877
Year ⇥ Sector FEs p p p p
Controls
p p
Firm FEs
p p
K-P stat 2583 2679 12678 13071
# firms 46825 46544 46825 46584
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level).  xt ⌘ xt+1 xt.
* : p<0.10, ** : p<0.05, *** : p<0.01. Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instru-
mented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is
therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. Controls include VA per worker,
value of assets, average wage and total hours workers in the firm (lagged and log).
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4.3.3 Comparing ex-post and ex-ante analysis
As an alternative to the ex-post analysis conducted until now, we consider the following
ex-ante approach: 1) estimate the impact of unit labor costs on exports in the period
immediately preceding the treatment (2010-2012), 2) combining those estimates with the
percent change in the labor costs implied by the CICE policy, one can predict what is
the expected change in export values linked to the policy.
We proceed with step 1 following closely the approach by Decramer et al. (2016),
with the LHS being the change in logged export values, and the RHS being the change
in unit labor costs (measured as wagebill over value added of the firm).11
Table 9 reports results and contrary to preceding tables, the overall picture is one
of negative significant e↵ect of unit labor costs on export patterns. The elasticities are
quite robust in significance and magnitude over di↵erent specifications ranging from 17
to 20%.
Table 9: Unit labor cost and exports (2010-2012)
(1) (2) (3) (5)
  ln xit   ln xit   ln xit   ln xit
ln(unit labor cost) -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.168*** -0.200***
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0196)
Year FEs
p p
Sector FEs
p
Year ⇥ Sector FEs p p
Controls
p
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level).  xt ⌘ xt+1   xt. * : p<0.10, ** :
p<0.05, *** : p<0.01. Our explanatory variable is defined as the log of labor compensation over valued-added. The
expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years
2010 to 2012. Exports are aggregated at the firm-year level in level before computing the logarithm.
Column (4), which is the most comparable to the specification of Decramer et al.
(2016), finds an elasticity of -0.20. Those coe cients are strikingly close to those obtained
by Decramer et al. (2016), who also find -0.2 for manufacturing Belgian exporters between
1999 and 2010.12 We can calculate the “mechanical” fall in labor costs due to the CICE
policy by removing the received subsidy from the total wagebill. This reduction in the
unit labor costs was around 1.9 % on average in our intensive margin sample between
2012 and 2013. Using this fall combined with coe cients from Table 9, one can quantify
that the policy was ex-ante predicted to have a large e↵ect on exports, raising its average
11Note that we aggregate exports across destinations at the firm and year level in order to make our
specification as comparable as possible to Decramer et al. (2016). We refer precisely to their Table 6,
panel a, where the dependent variable is the same as ours.
12We also ran this type of regressions for the years 1995 to 2010 on French data and found very
comparable estimates.
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growth rate by 0.34 percentage points between 2012 and 2013.
It is therefore a case where the ex-ante and ex-post analysis of a policy measure
di↵er dramatically. In our view, those contrasting results suggest a need for careful
interpretation of ex-ante approaches, in particular in terms of identification of the e↵ect
that is used in the first step and its relevance for the actual policy carried over.13
5 Conclusion
Our paper investigates the impact of a change in labor costs on export patterns. Using
a large panel of French firms, we use a recent policy experiment where a share of gross
wages is reimbursed to firms via a tax credit. Firms are treated according to a threshold
applied to each employees’ compensation. We use the variation in treatment implied by
this rule to assess whether export values and/or the probability of participating in export
markets is a↵ected by labor costs.
We first find a negative albeit insignificant correlation between exported values and
the intensity of policy treatment. This could be explained by issues of reverse causality,
whereby firms experiencing negative demand shocks lower their employees’ wage rate and
therefore are targeted more generously by the tax credit. However, our instrumentation
strategy also points to statistically insignificant e↵ects. Essentially, signs and magnitudes
of our estimates are as expected, but very noisy. This lack of precision is not related to a
weak first-stage as our instrument is strongly predictive of the actual treatment. There
are in our view two interpretations.
First, while our instrument solves the issue of reverse causation between the outcome
and the policy treatment, it does not solve entirely the issue of unobserved heterogeneity.
Time-varying controls and allowing sectors to be flexibly a↵ected by the business cycle is
the best we can do on that front but might still be insu cient. The second interpretation
is that the policy itself failed to deliver the expected e↵ect of a cut in labor cost. This
could be explained by the complex design of the policy which took the form of a tax
credit rather than a direct cut in payroll taxes.
We note that the transformation of the CICE from a tax credit into a payroll tax
cut has been quite consensual among both government o cials and employers’ repre-
sentatives. We interpret this convergence in opinions as evidence supporting the second
interpretation. The likely transformation of the policy, due to take place in 2019, should
o↵er a nice setup for future research to disentangle the respective influence of research
13In preceding versions of our paper, we conducted the ex-post analysis aggregating exports across
destinations at the firm-year level. This does not improve the match between ex-post and ex-ante analysis
in any discernible way.
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versus policy design on the disappointing estimated results of the policy.
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A Additional Figure
Figure A1: Initially export-oriented firms in manufacturing were less exposed to the
policy - 2013
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Note: Each dot corresponds to a quantile (20) of the treatment intensity in 2013. The height of each dot is determined
by the average export intensity in the matching quantile.
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